Abstract. When restricted to proving Σ q i formulas, the quantified propositional proof system G * i is closely related to the Σ b i theorems of Buss's theory S i 2 . Namely, G * i has polynomial-size proofs of the translations of theorems of S i 2 , and S i 2 proves that G * i is sound. However, little is known about G * i when proving more complex formulas. In this paper, we prove a witnessing theorem for G * i similar in style to the KPT witnessing theorem for T i 2 . This witnessing theorem is then used to show that S i 2 proves G * i is sound with respect to Σ q i+1 formulas. Note that unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses S i 2 is the weakest theory in the S2 hierarchy for which this is true. The witnessing theorem is also used to show that G * 1 is p-equivalent to a quantified version of extended-Frege for prenex formulas. This is followed by a proof that Gi p-simulates G * i+1 . We finish by proving that S2 can be axiomatized by S 1 2 plus axioms stating that the cut-free version of G * 0 is sound. All together this shows that the connection between G * i and S i 2 does not extend to more complex formulas. §1. Introduction. In [9], Krajicek and Pudlak introduced the quantified propositional proof system G and its fragments. These fragments have close connections with bounded arithmetic and computational complexity. In particular, the collapse of the polynomial-time hierarchy, the bounded arithmetic hierarchy S 2 , and the fragments of G are all related [9, 8, 7, 11] . Even with these close connections to important open problems in logic and computer science, little work has been done investigating the fragments of G. In this paper, we take a closer look at them. The proof system G * i has informally been described as the non-uniform version of S 
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2 proves that G * 1 is sound with respect to Σ q 1 formulas. However, in [12] , Morioka proved that, assuming the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse, S 1 2 does not prove that G * 1 is sound with respect to Σ q 3 formulas. This does not fit with the view that G * 1 is the non-uniform version of S 1 2 . In fact, it seems that, as the quantifier complexity of the formulas we are proving grows, the reasoning power of G * 1 grows beyond any finite level of the S 2 hierarchy. For the same proof also shows that, assuming the polynomial-time hierarchy does not collapse, T . This leads to the final way of examining G * 1 . In [9] , Krajicek and Pudlak were able to prove that S 2 can be axiomatized by S 1 2 plus axioms stating G i is sound relative to Σ q i formulas, for i ∈ N. We show that the same is true when G i is replaced by G It also holds for i = 0 with P V in place of T i 2 . This theorem has been used to prove that the collapse of the S 2 hierarchy implies the collapse of the polynomialtime hierarchy [8] , and to show that certain weak theories do not prove the Σ b 1 replacement scheme, relative to some complexity assumptions [6] . In this paper, we adapt the statement of the KPT witnessing theorem to G * i , and then prove it. The main difficulty is that proofs of the KPT witnessing theorem rely on the cut-elimination theorem, which unfortunately causes the size of the proof to increase exponentially. We must avoid this increase, so we have to find a way to work around cut formulas.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the basic definitions and notations. Note that we will be using two-sorted theories of bounded arithmetic (V i ) in place of the single-sorted theories (S i 2 ). In Section 3, we prove the witnessing theorem for G * i . In Section 4, we use the witnessing theorem to prove that GP V * p-simulates G * 1 . In Section 5, we show that G i p-simulates G * i+1 . In Section 6, we prove the Σ q i+1 reflection principle for G * i in S i 2 . In Section 7, we give a new axiomatization of S 2 .
I should mention that this paper is an expanded version of a conference paper [14] . The main difference is this paper has the witnessing theorem for G * i proofs of any formula as opposed to G * 1 proofs of prenex formulas. At this point, I would like to thank my supervisor Stephen Cook for comments on earlier versions of this paper. §2. Basic Definitions And Notation.
2.1. Two-Sorted Bounded Arithmetic. In the introduction, the results were stated for the theories S i 2 . However, we will use two-sorted theories of bounded arithmetic. We follow the presentation in [3, 5] . The two sorts are numbers and binary strings (aka finite sets). The numbers are intended to range over the natural numbers and will be denoted by lower-case letters. For example, i, j, x, y, and z will often be used for number variables; r, s, and t will be used for number terms; and f , g and h will be used for functions that return numbers. The sets are intended to be finite sets of natural numbers. Since the sets are finite, they can be coded by binary strings where the ith bit is 1 if i is in the set. The strings will be denoted by upper-case letters. The letters X,Y , and Z will often be used for string variables; and F , G and H will be used for functions that return strings.
The base language is L 2 A = {0, 1, +, ×, <, =, = 2 , ∈, ||} . The constants 0 and 1 are number constants. The functions + and × take two numbers as input and return a number-the intended meanings are the obvious ones. The language also includes two binary predicates that take two numbers: < and =. The predicate = 2 is meant to be equality between strings, instead of numbers. In practice, the 2 will not be written because which equality is meant is obvious from the context. The membership predicate ∈ takes a number i and a string X. It is meant to be true if the ith bit of X is 1 (or i is in the set X). This will also be written as X(i). The final function |X| takes a string as input and returns a number. It is intended to be the number of bits needed to write X when leading zeros are removed (or the least upper bound of the set X). The set of axioms 2BASIC is the set of defining axioms for L Another theory we often use is V P V , a universal theory with a function symbol for every polynomial-time function. The function symbols have the following defining axioms based on Cobham's Theorem: Definition 2.2 (PV function symbols). The language L F P is the smallest set satisfying the following:
there is a string function F φ,t and a number function f φ,t in L F P . 3. For each triple G, H, t, where G( x, X) and H(y, x, X, Z) are functions in
A . The rest of the functions symbols have the following defining axioms:
The theory V P V is axiomatized by quantifier-free equivalents of the 2BASIC axioms, induction on all open Σ B 0 (P V ) formulas, and the defining axioms for all of the L F P function symbols. See [3, 5] for more information on V P V .
Another scheme of formulas we use is the Σ B i -MAX scheme:
where φ is Σ B i . This scheme essentially says that, if there exists a value for x less than b that satisfies φ(x), then there exists a maximum x less than b that satisfies φ(x). It can be shown that Σ From time to time, we will use functions symbols that are not in L
2
A . The first is X(i, j) ≡ X( i, j ), where i, j = (i + j)(i + j + 1) + 2j is the pairing function. It can be thought of as a two dimensional array of bits. The second is the row function. The notation we use is X [i] . This functions returns the ith row of the two dimensional array X. In the same way, we can also describe three dimensional arrays. We also want to pair string.
Note that, if we add these functions with their Σ B 0 defining axioms to the theory V i , we get a conservative extension. They can also be used in the induction axioms [3] . This means that, if there is a V i proof of a formula that uses these functions, there is a V i proof of the same formula that does not use these functions.
2.2. Quantified Propositional Calculus. We are also interested in quantified propositional proof systems. The proof systems we use were originally defined in [9] , and then they were redefined in [4, 12] , which is the presentation we follow.
The set of connectives are {∧, ∨, ¬, ∃, ∀, , ⊥}, where and ⊥ are constants for true and false, respectively. Formulas are built using these connectives in the usual way. We will often refer to formulas by the number of quantifier alternations. 
The first proof system, from which all others will be defined, is the proof system G. This proof system is a sequent calculus based on Gentzen's system LK. The system G is essentially the DAG-like, propositional version of LK. We will not give all of the rules, but will mention a few of special interest.
The cut rule is A, Γ → ∆ Γ → ∆, A cut Γ → ∆ In this rule, we call A the cut formula. There are also four rules that introduce quantifiers:
These rules have conditions on them. In ∃-left and ∀-right, the variable x must not appear in the bottom sequent. In these rules, x is called the eigenvariable.
In the other two rules, the formula B must be a Σ q 0 formula, and no variable that appears free in B can be bound in A(x).
The initial sequents of G are sequents of the form → , ⊥ →, or x → x, where x is any propositional variable. A G proof is a series of sequents such that each sequent is either an initial sequent or can be derived from previous sequents using one of the rules of inference. The proof system G i is G with cut formulas restricted to Σ q i formulas. We define G * as the treelike version of G. So, a G * proof is a G proof where each sequent in used as an upper sequent in an inference at most once. A G * i proof is a G * proof in which cut formulas are prenex Σ q i . In [12] , it was shown that, for treelike proofs, it did not matter if the cut formulas in G * i were prenex or not. So when we construct G * i proofs the cut formulas will not always be prenex, but that does not matter.
To make proofs simpler, we assume that all treelike proofs are in free-variable normal form. Definition 2.4. A parameter variable for a G * i proof π is a variable that appears free in the final sequent of π. A proof π is in free-variable normal form if (1) every non-parameter variable is used as an eigenvariable exactly once in π, and (2) parameter variables are not used as eigenvariables.
Note that, if a proof is treelike, we can always put it in free-variable normal form by simply renaming variables. In fact, V P V proves that every treelike proof can be put in free-variable normal form.
A useful property of these proof systems is the subformula property. It can be shown in VPV that every formula in a G * i proof is an ancestor (and therefore a subformula) of a cut formula or a formula in the final sequent. This is useful because it tells us that any non-Σ q i formula in a G * i proof must be an ancestor of a final formula.
2.3. Truth Definitions. In order to reason about the proof systems in the theories, we must be able to reason about quantified propositional formulas. We follow the presentation in [7, 9] .
Formally formulas will be coded as string, but we will not distinguish between a formula and its encoding. So if F is a formula, we will use F as the string encoding the formula as well. The method of coding a formula can be found in [4] . The encoding of an assignment A will be a set of pairs i, 0 and i, 1 which mean that the variable x i is assigned false and true, respectively.
The truth definition will be defined in the usual way. For Σ q i formulas, we will construct a formula that essentially says there exists an evaluation of the formula and it evaluates to true. For Π q i formula, the statement is the same except we say that all evaluations evaluate to true. The definition will be given recursively. Because of the potentially large and repetitive nature of the definition, we will only give part of the definition and leave it to the reader to complete it. Given a Σ q i formula F , an evaluation of that formula will be a series of lines. Each line will consist of a truth value and a subformula of F . Plus each line will have to be consistent with previous lines. With this in mind, we have the following definition.
where eval ∃ i (E, A, X, F ) is a formula saying that E is a series of lines assigning truth values to subformulas of F and X assigns values to the outermost even existential quantifiers and the outermost odd universal quantifiers. An even quantifier is one that is in the scope of an even number of ¬, and an odd quantifier is on that is in the scope of an odd number of ¬. More formally eval
is the conjunction of the following. Note that we do not give the bounds on the quantified variables, but the reader can fill in what they should be.
• For every line l, if the outermost connective of the formula is ∧ and the formula is true, then there are earlier lines j 1 , j 2 saying both left subformula F 1 and right subformula F 2 are true.
Note that the case of ∨ with a false formula is handled the same way.
• For every line l, if the outermost connective of the formula is ∧ and the formula is false, then there is an earlier line j saying one of the left subformula F 1 or right subformula F 2 is false.
Note that the case of ∨ with a true formula is handled the same way.
• For every line l, if the outermost connective of the formula is ¬ and the formula is true, then there is a previous line j saying the subformula is false.
Note that this is the only case where the truth value changes, so the truth value can also be viewed as the parity of the number of negations that were passed to reach this subformula.
• For every line l, if the outermost connective of the formula is ∃ and the formula is true, then there is a previous line j with a witness for the quantifier and X gives us that value.
Note that the case of ∀ with a false formula is handled the same way.
• For every line l, if the outermost connective of the formula is ∃ and the formula is false, then the formula is a Σ q i−1 formula, and it is false according to |= i−1 .
Note that the case of ∀ with a true formula is handled the same way.
• For every line l, if the formula is a single variable, then the truth value is consistent with A.
∀l,
where eval Notice that in eval ∃ i if the outermost connective is ∀ and we want to falsify it, then it is treated like ∃. The connectives ∧ and ∨ are also treated the same when we are trying to satisfy one and falsify the other. When we see a ∀ and we want to satisfy the formula, we know the quantifier complexity of the formula has dropped. Therefore, we can get the value of this formula recursively. If we are looking at a Σ q 0 formula the recursive case never comes up. For a Σ q i formula, we are saying there is an evaluation of the formula that says it is true. For a Π q i formula, we are saying that all evaluations of the formula say it is true. This is an important difference since a Σ 
there is a PV function P arse ∧ (F, j) that outputs F min(j,n) . The same goes for ∨ in place of ∧. The theory V P V proves the Tarski conditions for the truth definition.
Lemma 2.6 (Tarski's Conditions). V P V proves the following
Proof. (1) Suppose A |= i F 1 ∧ F 2 and the formula is Σ q i , then there is an evaluation of this formula. This evaluation would contain the line ( , F 1 ∧ F 2 ). Therefore this evaluation would also contain lines of the form ( , F 1 ) and ( , F 2 ). This means we have evaluations of F 1 and F 2 . Suppose A |= F 1 ∧ A |= F 2 . Then there exist evaluations of these formulas. An evaluation for F 1 ∧ F 2 is obtained from these evaluations by combining these evaluations and adding a new line using Σ 
By the first assumption, there is an evaluation of F ≡ F n with a line ⊥, F . If there is a line in the evaluation of the form ⊥, F m+1 , then there is a line ⊥, F m . Note that ⊥, F m cannot appear in a line by the second assumption. So it follows by induction that there is a line saying that F 1 ≡ F 1 is false, but this contradicts the second assumption. Now suppose ∀j ≤ |F | A |= i P arse ∧ (F, j) is false. Then there exists an evaluation of F j , for some j, with a line ⊥, F j . To this evaluation we can append the lines ⊥,
Note that the proof of (3) does not work if F is a Σ q i formula since A |= i F could be false because there is no evaluation of F . There is not necessarily an evaluation that shows F is false.
(4) This is the dual of (3).
(5) We assume F is a Π q i formula. The case where F is a Σ q i formula is essentially the same. Suppose (A |= i ¬F ). Then there exists an evaluation of F with a line , ¬F . This means the evaluation also has a line ⊥, F , proving ¬(A |= i F ). Suppose ¬(A |= i F ). There there exists an evaluation of F with line ⊥, F . The line , ¬F can be appended to this evaluation, proving (A |= i ¬F ).
(6) This follows directly from the ∃X in the definition of |= i . (7) This is the dual of (6). (8) This follows directly from the recursive nature of the definition.
Valid formulas (or tautologies) are defined as
This truth definition can be extended to define the truth of a sequent.
there exists a formula in Γ that A does not satisfy"
∨ "there exists a formula in ∆ that A satisfies"
Another important formula we will use is the reflection principle for a proof system. We define the Σ q i reflection principle for a proof system P as Σ
This formula essentially says that, if there exists a P proof of a Σ q i formula F , then F is valid. Another way of putting it is to say that P is sound when proving Σ q i formulas. §3. KPT Style Witnessing for Fragments of G. In bounded arithmetic, a useful tool has been the KPT witnessing theorem [8] . In the simplest case, the KPT witnessing theorem describes how to witness the Σ B 2 theorems of V P V . The original theorem was more general, but we state it here for the simplest case.
, where φ is a Σ B 0 formula. Then there exists a finite sequence of P V function symbols
. . .
Informally, this can be viewed as an interactive computation between a student, who runs in polynomial time, and an all-knowing teacher. Given a value for X, the student's goal is the find a witness for ∃Y ∀Zφ(X, Y, Z). The student starts by computing F 1 (X). If that is not a witness, the teacher responds with a counter example W [1] . Using that the students makes a second guess by computing F 2 . The teacher responds with W [2] , and this process continues. Our goal is to get a similar theorem for G * 1 , and to extend this to G * i . The rest of this section is organized as follows. We start by stating the analog of the above theorem for G * 1 . Using this as a starting point, we then define the concepts needed to prove this theorem. Our presentation will be based on a proof of the Herbrand Theorem. We then prove an analog of the Herbrand Theorem for G * 1 , and as a corollary we get a proof of the KPT Witnessing Theorem for G * 1 . In the second subsection, we explain how to generalize the Herbrand Theorem for G * 1 so it works for G * i . 2. An extension cedent is a series of formulas of the form e 1 ↔ E 1 , e 2 ↔ E 2 , . . . , e n ↔ E n such that E i is a Σ q 0 formula that does not mention the variables e i , e i+1 , . . . , e n . We say that e i depends on a variable q if E i mentions q or E i mentions a variable that depends on q.
Observe that an extension cedent is really a description of a circuit, and that polynomial-size circuits are the nonuniform version of polynomial-time functions. So extension cedents replace the functions. , where e i ∈ E 2. Λ is an extension cedent defining a new set of variables E in terms of q 1 , . . . , q n and p, 3. e i does not depend on q j , for j ≥ i, and 4. q i and q j are disjoint.
Before we prove this theorem, notice that this is similar to the KPT Witnessing theorem for V P V . The row W
[i] corresponds to q i , and F i corresponds to the circuits defining e i . The major difference is that the number of rounds in the student-teacher game is not constant; it can grow polynomially in the size of the proof.
One way of proving the KPT Witnessing Theorem is to observe that it is a corollary to the Herbrand Theorem. So the idea behind our proof is to adjust the proof-theoretic proof of the Herbrand Theorem. See [1] Section 3 for an outline of the proof we use as a model. The main difference between our proof and that proof is that cut elimination cannot be used since it causes an exponential increase in the size of the proof. To get around this problem, we use the idea in [5] to prove that extended-Frege p-simulates G * We prove the Herbrand Theorem for all Σ q i formulas, but before we can state the general theorem, we need a few definitions. The first one has more to do with notation. The q variables come from the eigenvariables in the G * 1 proof. To make it easier to refer to these variables, we use the following notation: Notation 3.4. Let π be a G * proof. Then the set Q π will be the set of variables that are used as eigenvariables in π. If S is a sequent in π, then Q π,S will be the set of variables that are used as eigenvariables in the subproof of π ending with S. We will refer to Q π,S as Q S when π is understood.
Note that π is treelike, and, if it is in free-variable normal form and S is derived from S 1 and S 2 , then Q S = Q S1 ∪ Q S2 , and Q S1 ∩ Q S2 = ∅.
The general witnessing theorem will be for G * 1 proofs of any formula A. In the end, we want a G * 0 proof of a sequent Λ → A * , where A * is an instance of of an ∨-expansion of A defined below.
From now on we assume quantifiers do not appear in the scope of a ¬. If we did not assume this, we would have to add a separate cases for when quantifiers appear in the scope of an odd number of quantifiers and an even number. 
(α)
Note that A is an ∨-expansion of A.
Definition 3.6 ((Q, E)-instance). Let Q and E be disjoint sets of variables. A (Q, E)-instance of a formula A is a quantifier-free formula A obtained from A by replacing universally-quantified variables by distinct variables in Q and existentially-quantified variables by distinct variables in E.
is an ∨-expansion of A. This can be seen by replacing B 2 (x) and ∀yB 3 (x, y). We renamed the copy of y to y to emphasis it is now a different quantified variable. If q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q and e ∈ E, then the formula
is not because y and y were replaced by the same variable.
For another example, consider a prenex formula
where B is a Σ q 0 formula. Then an instance of an ∨-expansion of this formula is a formula of the form
So in Theorem 3.3, the disjunction of the formulas in Θ is a (Q π , E)-instance of A. Because of this, Theorem 3.3 is simply a special case of the Herbrand Theorem for G * 1 below. Observe that in Theorem 3.3, there is an ordering on the variables. Namely the variables q i come before the variables q i+1 . We could also extend this ordering to include the extension variables. An extension variable would have to be larger than every variable it depends on. For the general case, we want something similar. To make the proof simpler, we will use ≺ to refer to this ordering. The ordering ≺ orders the eigenvariables Q and the extension variables E. Then A * will be more than a (Q, E)-instance; it will be a (Q, E, ≺)-instance. Definition 3.8. (Q, E, ≺)-instance Let B be a (Q, E)-instance of a formula A, and let ≺ be an ordering on Q ∪ E. Then B is a (Q, E, ≺)-instance of A if z 1 ≺ z 2 whenever z 2 replaces a quantified variable that is in the scope of the quantified variable that z 1 replaced.
Example 3.9. Take A * from the previous example. Then
The idea of an instance is essentially the witnessing substitution from [1] . Now we are prepared to state the general theorem. ). There exists a P V function F such that V P V proves the following. Let π be a G * 1 proof of A. Then, given π, F outputs a G * 0 proof of a sequent Λ → A * and a total ordering ≺ of the variables Q π ∪ E, where E is a set of variables that do not appear in π, with the following properties:
• Λ is an extension cedent defining the variables in E in terms of Q π and the free variables of A; • for e ∈ E, if e depends on a variable p ∈ Q π ∪ E, then p ≺ e; and • A * is a (Q π , E, ≺)-instance of an ∨-expansion of A Proof. The G * 0 proof that we are looking for will be constructed by changing π one sequent at a time starting with the initial sequents and working our way down. To simplify this construction, we use the "multiplicative" form of two hypothesis rules instead of the "additive" form. For example, the multiplicative form of ∧-right is
We use this form instead of the more standard form
This is something that was also done in [1] . The advantage of the multiplicative form is that, except for the principal formula, each formula in the bottom sequent has a single parent in the upper sequents. So, in essence, we have removed implicit contractions. We also ignore the order of the formulas in the sequents. So a sequent is a pair of multi-sets. One set for the left side of the sequent, and one set for the right side.
Let S be any sequent in π. By the subformula property of G * 
of an ∨-expansion of B; and 6. each q ∈ Q S appears in at most one formula in Γ , ∆ , and Ω .
Note that ≺ is only defined on the extension variables and eigenvariables used so far. Initially, ≺ is an ordering where nothing is comparable. As we move down the proof, we order the variables.
The proof is done by induction on the depth of S in the proof π. If we let S be the final sequent, we get a proof of the theorem since Q π = Q S , and conditions 3-5 are the conditions we need for the theorem. Also, note that the induction hypothesis can be stated as a Σ B 0 (P V ) formula (is a polynomial-time predicate) by saying that the output of the function F on the first i sequents of π meets all of the conditions. This means the induction can be carried out in V P V .
The description of F is done in cases. There is a separate case for each rule of inference. The construction is similar to the proof that extended-Frege psimulates G * 1 (Theorem 7.48 of [5] ). The difference is that the variables need to be ordered.
When the last inference is the ∨, ∧, ¬ introduction rules, the same rule can be applied in the G * 0 proof we are constructing. It is a simple exercise to check that the induction hypothesis still holds. The same would go for weakening. The other cases are more involved, and are given below. Inductive Case 1: S is inferred using cut Suppose
and that it is derived from
where D( x) is a Σ q 0 formula. By induction, we have a G * 0 proof of the sequents
with an ordering ≺ 1 on Q S1 ∪ E 1 and
with an ordering ≺ 2 on Q S2 ∪ E 2 . In this case, we let
We say p 1 ≺ p 2 is true if any of the following conditions hold:
We can prove S by taking the proof of S 1 and replacing q with e. Because the proofs are treelike, the substitution does not cause any problems. We can then do the cut with S 1 and S 2 .
We now look at each part of the induction hypothesis to be sure it still holds. Properties 1 to 3 are obvious.
Let us prove property 4. Suppose
Property 5 follows directly form the induction hypothesis. Property 6 follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that Q S1 and Q S2 are disjoint. Inductive Case 2: S is inferred using ∀-right Suppose S ≡ Γ → ∆, ∀yD(y), Ω and it is derived from S 1 ≡ Γ → ∆, D(q), Ω. By induction with S 1 , there exists a sequent S 1 and an ordering ≺ 1 satisfying the induction hypothesis. In S 1 , there is a formula D * (q) that is a (Q S1 , E, ≺ 1 )-instance of an ∨-expansion of A. That same formula is also a (Q S , E, ≺)-instance of an ∨-expansion of ∀yD(y) now that q is part of Q S .
The construction for this case is fairly simple. We let S be the same as S 1 , and the ordering ≺ is the same as ≺ 1 except q is now smaller than everything in Q S1 ∪ E. That is, q is the smallest variable of all variables ordered so far. Inductive Case 3: S is inferred using ∃-right Suppose S ≡ Γ → ∆, ∃xD(x), Ω and it is derived from where e is a new extension variable. As for the ordering ≺, it is defined by extending ≺ 1 by making e the minimum element. Note that
It is easy to derive S 2 . Then it is possible to derive S from S 1 and S 2 by cutting D * (F ), which is a Σ q 0 formula. We now look at each part of the induction hypothesis to be sure it still holds. It is easy to see that properties 1 to 3 and property 6 still hold.
For property 4, if e, the new extension variable, depends on p, then p must appear in F , which is part of S 1 . This means that p ∈ Q S ∪ E. So, property 4 holds for e. For other variables, it holds directly from the induction hypothesis.
For property 5, the only instance that changed is D * (F ), assuming ∃xD(x) is not a Σ q 1 formula. Since e replaced the outermost quantifier, e does not have to be larger than any variable, and it is smaller than every variable that replaced inside variables. Therefore D * (e) is a (Q S , E, ≺)-instance of an ∨-expansion of ∃xD(x). Inductive Case 4: S is inferred using contraction-right Suppose
and it is derived from
We look at two different cases: D is a Σ 
, Ω with the ordering ≺ 1 on Q S1 ∪ E. We now have two witnesses for D, and we need to pick the one that works. So, in this case, we let
, Ω , where e 3 are new extension variables. The ordering ≺ is defined as ≺ 1 with e 3 added as the maximum elements so far. Now we look at each part of the induction hypothesis to be sure it still holds. For properties 1 to 3, notice that the initial part of S is part of the extension cedent and it defines the new variables e 3 . With this observation, it is easy to see that properties 1 to 3 still hold. Now to look at property 4. Since e 3 are the largest elements in the ordering ≺, anything they depend on must be incomparable or smaller. So property 4 holds for e 3 . For other extension variables, it holds directly from the induction hypothesis. Property 5 follows directly from the induction hypothesis since Ω did not change. Property 6 follows directly from the induction hypothesis. and it is derived from
The formula D must be a Σ q 1 formula and an ancestor of a cut formula. Let it be of the form ∃xF (x), where F (x) is a Σ q 0 formula. For now, we assume that D has a single existential quantifier, but the construction easily generalizes. By induction with S 1 , there exists a sequent S 1 of the form
with an ordering ≺. Without lose of generality, assume that q 1 ≺ q 2 . Then, we let
The ordering will remain the same.
To prove S , we take the proof of S 1 , replace every instance of q 2 by q 1 , and then contract the two copies of F (q 1 ). The substitution can be done because the proof is treelike.
We now look at each part of the induction hypothesis to be sure it still holds. It is easy to see that properties 1 to 3 hold. Property 4 follows from the induction hypothesis. Note that, if a variable depended on q 2 , it now depends on q 1 , but that is fine since q 1 is smaller.
Property 5 holds since Ω did not change.
From this, we are able to prove the witnessing theorem (Theorem 3.3). We will restate it here. , where e i ∈ E 2. Λ is an extension cedent defining a new set of variables E in terms of q 1 , . . . , q n and p, 3. e i does not depend on q j , for j ≥ i, and 4. q i and q j are disjoint.
Proof. By the Herbrand theorem above, there is a proof of Λ → A * , where A * is a (Q π , E, ≺)-instance of an ∨-expansion of A. We need to show how to get Θ from A * . The first observation we make is that A * is of the from
This is true because the rule (α) gives multiple copies of B, which all remain in tact since B is a Σ q 0 formula, combined using ∨. This means that A * is essentially the Θ we want.
Without lose of generality, we can assume that, if i < j, then the smallest variable in q i is smaller than the smallest variable in q j . This implies that e i does not depend on q j for j ≥ i. This is because every variable in e i is smaller than every variable in q i since we have a (Q π , E, ≺)-instance. The final observation is that if q i and q j contain a common variable then e i and e j must be the same. Otherwise, if e i and e j are different, then an application of (α) must have occurred that would make part of e i and e j correspond to different existential variables. Since the universal variables are in the scope of these existential variables, q i and q j would correspond to different quantifiers making them disjoint.
If we have that q i and q j are not disjoint, we are able to replace q j by q i everywhere in the proof. Then we can contract the two copies of B( e i , q i ).
Witnessing for G *
i . In the statement of the original KPT witnessing theorem for V P V , polynomial-time functions are used to find the possible witnesses; however, for T V i , the KPT witnessing theorem uses functions in F P Σ p i . Corresponding to that we will generalize the definition of an extension cedent to allow oracles from the other levels of the polynomial hierarchy. Definition 3.12 (i-extension cedent). An i-extension cedent is a series of formulas of the form e 1 ↔ E 1 , e 2 ↔ E 2 , . . . , e n ↔ E n such that E m is a Σ q i ∪ Π q i formula that does not mention the variables e m , e m+1 , . . . , e n .
Note that an extension cedent is the same as a 0-extension cedent. Example 3.15. Let A be the formula ∃ x∀ y∃ zB( x, y, z), where B is a Σ q 0 formula. Then a (1, Q, E, ≺)-instance of A would be ∃ zB( e, q, z) and a (2, Q, E, ≺)-instance would be ∀ y∃ zB( e, y, z). * and a total ordering ≺ of the variables Q π ∪ E, where E is a set of variables that do not appear in π, with the following properties:
• Λ is a (i − 1)-extension cedent defining the variables in E in terms of Q π and the free variables of A; • for e ∈ E, if e depends on a variable p ∈ Q π ∪ E, then p ≺ e; and
Before we prove this theorem, we should note that it does not seem like we can improve the complexity of the extension cedent. For, if the (i − 1)-extension cedent could be replaced by a (i − 2)-extension cedent, this could be used to show that G * i−1 p-simulates G * i for prenex formulas. The proof would be similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.16. The proof is almost the same as in the G * 1 case. The quantifier complexity of the cut formulas is reduced by witnessing the outermost block of existential quantifiers with extension variables. The only difference is that we can no longer skip all of the quantifier introduction rules. Some will have to be added. For example, if we have a cut formula ∃ x∀ yC( x, y), then we will replace x by extension variables, but we still add ∀ y to the formula. This construction can be described more formally. As before, each sequent S in π can be divided into three parts: Γ which contains all of the formulas on the left-hand side; ∆, which contains the formulas on the right-hand side that are ancestors of cut formulas; and Ω, which contains the ancestors of the final formula on the right-hand side. Note that by the subformula property, we know that Γ and ∆ contain only Σ Λ is an (i − 1)-extension cedent defining E; 4. for e ∈ E, if e depends on a variable p ∈ Q S ∪ E, then p ≺ e; 5. Ω is obtained from Ω by replacing each formula B by an (i − 1, Q S , E, ≺)-instance of an (i − 1)-expansion of B; and 6. each q ∈ Q S appears in at most 1 formula in Γ , ∆ , and Ω . The construction is the same as in Theorem 3.10 except for the need to add a few new cases. If ∃-right is applied with a Σ q i−1 principal formula or ∀-left is applied with a Π q i−1 principal formula, the same inference can be used in the G * i−1 proof we are constructing. We must also consider when S is derived using ∃-left with a Σ q i−1 principal formula and when S is derived using ∀-right with a Π q i−1 principal formula. Both cases are handled in the same way, so we only describe the latter.
Suppose
S ≡ Γ → ∆, ∀qD(q), Ω and it is derived from
, Ω where D(q) is Π q i−1 . By induction, we have a G * i−1 proof of S 1 , where
We know q does not appear in Γ or ∆ since is was used as an eigenvariable, but it is still possible that the extension variables depend on it, in which case it would appear in Λ.
The first step is to replace q by a new extension variable e. This gives
We then derive
See Lemma 3.17 below for how to do this. We finish by deriving
by cut with sequents (3.1) and (3.2) and cut formula D(e).
The ordering is changed by adding e as the smallest element. Note that, since D(q) is in S 1 , D(⊥) does not contain any extension variables or eigenvariables in Q S . With this fact in mind, we can see all of the conditions in the induction hypothesis follow. Proof. The proof for the two sequents are essentially the same, so we only give the construction for the first one. Informally, the reason the first sequent is true is that we are picking a value for e that makes B(e) false if possible. So, if B(⊥) is false, we make e false, otherwise we make e true, which is the only other possible value.
First, it is possible to get cut-free proofs of the following four sequents.
e, B(e) → B( )
This can be shown by simultaneous structural induction on the formula B(e). We use this in the following derivation: The second one is proved as follows: At first glance, it seems like GP V * would be a weaker proof system than G * 1 because the cut formulas are less expressive. The cut formulas in GP V * can be trivially witnessed, but the cut formulas in G * 1 are NP-hard. Nevertheless, it can be shown that GP V * and G * 1 are p-equivalent for prenex formulas. One direction is easy since every GP V * proof is a G * 1 proof, so all that is left is to prove the other direction. Theorem 4.2. V P V proves that GP V * p-simulates G * 1 for prenex formulas.
Proof. Let π be a G * 1 proof of a formula A of the form
where B is a Σ q 0 formula. By the Theorem 3.10, V P V proves that there exists a G * 0 proof π of a sequent Λ → A * and a total ordering ≺ of the variables Q π ∪ E meeting the conditions of the theorem. Since A is in prenex form, we know that A * is of the form m i=0 B( q i,0 , e i,1 , q i,2 , . . . , e i,n , q i,n ). From this we are able to get a proof of Λ → Θ where Θ ≡ B( q 0,0 , e 0,1 , q 0,2 , . . . , e 0,n , q 0,n ), . . . , B( q m,0 , e m,1 , q m,2 , . . . , e m,n , q m,n )
by deriving A * → Θ and cutting A * . We describe an algorithm that takes as input π and ≺. The algorithm extends π into a GP V * proof of A. At any stage, π will be a proof of a sequent Λ → Θ , where Λ is a subsequence of Λ and Θ is a sub-series of Θ with some quantifiers added. The algorithm has four steps:
Step 1: Add as many existential quantifiers to the formulas in Θ as possible using ∃-right rules such that the formula is still a subformula of A.
Step 2: Use contraction to combine as many formulas in Θ as possible.
Step 3: Find the largest variable that is mentioned in Λ or Θ .
Step 3a:
If it is an extension variable e, apply ∃-left to the formula e ↔ E with e as the eigenvariable. Then cut the formula ∃e[e ↔ E] after deriving → ∃e[e ↔ E].
Step 3b:
If it was an eigenvariable q in π, then apply ∀-right with q as the eigenvariable.
Step 4: Repeat steps 1 to 3 until there is no change.
At first, it may not be obvious that this algorithm works. For example, it is not obvious that the eigenvariable restriction for ∃-left or ∀-right rules in Step 3 is met. To show that the eigenvariable restriction is met, we make two observations. First, if p is the largest variable in Λ and Θ , then no extension variable can depend on p. Otherwise, that variable would be larger than p. Second, if we are in Step 3 and p is the largest variable in Λ and Θ , then p cannot be mentioned in Θ unless it is in Q π ; otherwise p would be an extension variable and have been used as the target formula in an ∃-right rule in Step 1. If this is not the case, an eigenvariable that appears to the right of p is still present, and this variable must be larger than p. For the same reason, we know that there cannot be two formulas in Θ with p replacing a universal variable that have not been contracted yet. This means the eigenvariable restriction is met in Step 3.
When the algorithm is done, we will have a proof of the formula we want. Notice that Λ would be empty because every extension variable has been removed. Also, Θ would be the single formula A since every formula in Θ would have every quantifier added by now, and would have been contracted to a single formula. We know the algorithm eventually stops because we continually reduce the number of variables in π . §5. G i and G * i+1 . As has already been mentioned, for i > 0, G i is commonly connected with the theory T V i and G * i+1 is commonly connected with V i+1 . Since the two theories have the same Σ B i+1 theorems, it was natural that the two proof systems are p-equivalent when proving Σ q i+1 formulas. However, we want to extend this to more general formulas. In [13] , it was shown that one direction is probably not possible. Namely that, under an appropriate complexity assumption, there is a family of Σ q i+2 formulas for which G * i+1 does not p-simulate G i . Here we prove that G i p-simulates G * i+1 for all formulas. The proof is based on the proof of Krajicek that depth d, DAG-like PK can p-simulate depth d + 1, treelike PK. The observation of the similarity between the two theorems is due to Toni Pitassi.
Definition 5.1 (The i-Substitution Rule). The i-substitution rule is
where C is a quantifier-free formula, A 1 , . . . , A m , B 1 , . . . , B n are Σ Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 2.1 in [9] . We will describe how to do the simulation for the case where there is one A and B. The general case is done the same way.
Suppose we have a derivation of Proof. At a high level, this proof is done by carefully applying one step of cut-elimination to each cut formula. The increase in the size of the proof in the cut-elimination theorem comes from repeating part of the proof multiple times. We avoid this increase by creating a DAG-like proof.
Let π be a G * i+1 proof. The reason π is not a G i proof is that it would contain cut formulas that are not Σ q i or Π q i . We can assume these formulas are Σ q i+1 and are of the form ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n C(x 1 , . . . , x n ), where C is Π q i . We can assume this because, in [12] , Morioka proved that we all G * i+1 proofs can be transformed into a G * i+1 proof where the cut formulas are prenex. We need to turn these cut formulas into Π For example, if S is the sequent
3 ), Γ → ∆, and when we prove S , we are allowed to use
4 ) → as an axiom. In essence, we are saying, if we can derive
we can prove S . Note that, when we get to the final sequent, no formula is an ancestor of a cut formula. Therefore, if S is the final formula in π, S = S and the only initial sequents are of the form x → x. So this will give us a proof of the theorem.
The construction of π is given inductively. There is a separate case for each rule of inference. Most cases are simple and are left to the reader. The only cases we will give are cut, ∃-left, and ∃-right.
Cut: Suppose S ≡ Γ → ∆ is derived from S 1 and S 2 using cut. Let the cut formula be ∃ xC( x). By induction with S 1 , we have a G i proof π 1 of
By induction with S 2 , we have a G i proof π 2 of Γ → ∆ using the axiom C( x C ) →. Notice that π 2 is a proof of the sequent we want, but it uses an axiom we are no longer able to use. However, π 1 gives us a derivation of this axiom, with a few extra formulas.
The first step in the construction of π is to add Γ to the left and ∆ to the right of every sequent in π 2 . This makes the axiom we want to remove C i ( x i ), Γ → ∆ , which is the final sequent π 1 . So, π is π 1 followed by the new π 2 . Note that the axiom would have been used once for every time ∃x n was introduced in the original proof. Each of these formulas would later be contracted into the single cut formula. However, since we are constructing a DAG-like proof, we do not need to repeat π 1 multiple times. This gives a proof of Γ , Γ → ∆ , ∆ , from which we can derive Γ → ∆ using contraction.
∃-left: Suppose S is ∃x j . . . ∃x n C(q 1 , . . . , q j−1 , x j , x j+1 , . . . , x n ), Γ → ∆, and it was derived from S 1 ∃x j+1 . . . ∃x n C(q 1 , . . . , q j−1 , q j , x j+1 , . . . , x n ), Γ → ∆.
By induction with S 1 , we get a G i proof of
Since q j was used as an eigenvariable, it only appears in that one formula. Therefore we can replace q j by x C j using the i-substitution rule. This gives us π . ∃-right: Suppose S is
and it was derived from S 1
First assume j < n. That is we had at least one quantifier already. By induction with S 1 , we get a G i proof of Γ → ∆ using the axiom
We cannot use this axiom anymore. Instead, we use the axiom C(. . . , x C j , . . . ) → and derive (5.5) using the i-substitution rule.
If j = n, the construction is a little different. By induction with S 1 , we get a
To construct π , we take the axiom we can now use, C(. . . , D n−1 , x C n ) →, and derive C(. . . , D n−1 , D n ) → using the i-substitution rule. Then we cut with (5.6). §6. Reflection Principles. We can also use the Herbrand Theorem to prove reflection principles. Proving reflection principles is the standard method of assessing the strength of a proof system relative to a theory. For example, the Σ q 1 reasoning of G * 1 is not stronger than the Σ
. Our goal is to find the weakest fragment of V that proves Σ q i -RFN(G * 1 ). In [12] , it was shown that T V 0 does not prove Σ We prove that, in fact, it does. We first prove the simplest case. Namely, that V 1 proves (prenex Σ q 2 )-RFN(G * 1 ). The proof serves as a template for the general case, which we prove right after.
Proof. Let π be a G * 1 proof of a prenex Σ q 2 formula A. So A is of the form ∃ x∀ yB( x, y, p), where B is a Σ q 0 formula. In this formula, p is all of the free variables in A, and should be understood as being implicitly universally quantified. We want to prove in V 1 that, given values for p, there exists values for x that witness the formula.
By the KPT witnessing theorem for G *
meeting the conditions of the theorem. Let ψ(m, Λ, Θ, P ) ≡ ∃E ∃Q "E is a truth assignment to the extension variables"
∧ "Q is a truth assignment to the eigenvariables"
This formula says that there exists assignments E and Q that satisfy Λ and make the first m formulas in Θ false. It is easy to bound the size of E and Q. This means that ψ is equivalent to a Σ B 1 formula. Using Σ B 1 -MAX, we find the maximum value m 0 for m that satisfies ψ given values for Λ, Θ, and P . Then e m0+1 are the witnesses we are looking for, which we now prove.
First note that ψ(0) is true. We can set Q to the assignment that sets everything to false, and compute E that satisfies Λ. Also note that m 0 < n since it is not possible the falsify all of the formulas in Θ. This would violate the Σ q 0 -RFN(G * 0 ), which is provable in V 1 . This means that e m0+1 exists. Let E and Q be witnesses for ψ(m 0 ). For the sake of contradiction assume e m0+1 is not a witness for ∃ x∀yB( x, y, p). Change Q so that q m0+1 are assigned values falsifying B( e m0+1 , q m0+1 , p). We can then change E so that Λ is satisfied. Since e j , for j ≤ m 0 + 1, does not depend on q m0+1 , their values stay the same. This means we now have E and Q making the first m 0 + 1 formula in Θ false, violating our choice of m 0 .
Proof. Suppose we have a G * i proof of a Σ q i+1 formula A. By Theorem 3.16, we can find a G * i−1 proof of an instance of an ∨-expansion of A, with and ordering ≺. Let A * be the ∨-expansion of A. Then, by Lemma 6.3 below, all we need to do is prove A * is valid in order to prove the reflection principle. This is done in a similar fashion to Theorem 6.1. In the previous case, a block of quantifiers was q i . In this theorem, we put all of the universal quantifiers that are in the scope of the same existential quantifiers in one group. For example, if A * ≡ (∃x 1 (∀y 1 B ∨ ∀y 2 B)) ∧ ∃x 2 (∀y 3 C ∧ ∃x 3 ∀y 4 D) then there are three groups of quantifiers. The variables y 1 and y 2 form one group since they are both in the scope of x 1 and no other variables. The variable y 3 forms the second group. It cannot be in the same group as y 4 because it is not in the scope of x 3 . The final group is y 4 . We order the groups of universal variables by the smallest variable in the group, and for each group we associate the formula where the variables for the smaller groups have been replaced. For example, we use A * above and the instance is A ≡ (B(e 1 , q 1 ) ∨ B(e 1 , q 2 )) ∧ (C(e 2 , q 3 ) ∧ D(e 2 , e 3 , q 4 ))
where q 3 ≺ q 1 ≺ q 4 ≺ q 2 . Then the formula associated with the group {q 1 , q 2 } is (B(e 1 , q 1 ) ∨ B(e 1 , q 2 )) ∧ (C(e 2 , q 3 ) ∧ ∃x 3 ∀y 4 D(e 2 , x 3 , y 4 ))
We removed the quantifiers ∀y 3 , ∀y 2 , and ∀y 1 , plus all existential quantifiers that are outside (smaller than) these universal quantifiers. Note we did not replace y 4 with q 4 because the group {q 4 } is larger then the group {q 1 , q 2 }, even if q 2 is larger than q 4 . Then, by Σ B i -MAX, we are able to find values for the eigenvariables that make as many of these formulas false, starting with the formula for the first group and going through the groups in order. By Σ q i−1 -RFN(G * i−1 ), which is provable in V i , we cannot make the last formula false. As before we are able to extract the witness we want. Proof. Done by induction on the number of applications of (α) (Definition 3.5) used to obtain A * from A. §7. New Axiomatization of V . In this section, we will strengthen a result from [9] . In that paper, Krajicek and Pudlak showed that V can be axiomatized by V 1 + {Σ q i -RFN(G i ) | i ∈ N}. A similar proof can be used to prove that V can be axiomatized by
In this section, we show that V can also be axiomatized by V 1 + {Σ q i -RFN(CF G * ) | i ∈ N}, where CF G * is the cut-free version of G * . Note that CF G * is a weaker proof system than any of the other fragments of G.
Just a bit of notation. If A is a formula with free variables p, then ∃A, called the existential closure of A, is the formula ∃ pA. The sequents in the rest of the proof are changed to include ∃(C i ∧ ¬C i ). Note that none of the inferences are affected by adding this formula. The only problem could be the eigenvariable restriction in ∃-left and ∀-right inferences; however, since the new formula does not have any free variables, there is no problem. At the end of the proof, the A is combined with the new formulas using ∨-right inferences.
Since the cut formulas are Σ Proof. Follows from the lemma above, Krajicek and Pudlak's axiomatization of V , and the fact that Σ In this paper, we looked at G i and G * i as proof systems for proving formulas with high quantifier complexity. Many questions of this type have been resolved, and, as a whole, these results indicate that power of these proof systems grows beyond any finite level of the V (or S 2 ) hierarchy.
The Herbrand theorem for G * i provides an interesting reduction of the provability of high complexity formulas to the provability of a Σ q i+1 formula. Only a couple corollaries have a been given, but we believe it is worth further exploring the use of this theorem as a tool in the proof theory of quantified propositional proof systems.
We still need to explore these proof systems as proof systems for low quantifier complexity formulas. One interesting problem would be the find the complexity of the witnessing problem for these proof systems. For example, we could ask how hard it is to find a witness for Σ q 1 formula given a G * i proof of the formula. It can be shown that this problem is equivalent to the corresponding witnessing problem in the associated theory. So the Σ q 1 witnessing problem for G * i has the same complexity as the Σ B 1 witnessing problem for V i . This would be related to the work in [10] , and may provide an alternative view of their results.
It would also be interesting to explore the provability of the reflection principles for formulas with low quantifier complexity. In particular, we could ask if V i proves that G * i+1 is consistent. People have thought of these problems ( [7] , Section 10.5), so the answers are not easy. However, this is still an important question to answer.
